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Abstract
A localised multisecret sharing scheme is a multisecret sharing scheme for an ordered set
of players in which players in the smallest sets who are authorised to access secrets are close
together in the underlying ordering. We define threshold versions of localised multisecret
sharing schemes, we provide lower bounds on the share size of perfect localised multisecret
sharing schemes in an information theoretic setting, and we give explicit constructions of
schemes to show that these bounds are tight. We then analyse a range of approaches to
relaxing the model that provide trade-offs between the share size and the level of security
guarantees provided by the scheme, in order to permit the construction of schemes with
smaller shares. We show how these techniques can be used in the context of an application
to key distribution for RFID-based supply-chain management motivated by the proposal of
Juels, Pappu and Parno from USENIX 2008.
1 Introduction
A secret sharing scheme is a means of distributing some information (shares) to a set of players
so that authorised subsets of players can recover a unique secret, whereas the shares belonging
to unauthorised subsets do not reveal any information about the secret. For example, a (t;n)-
threshold scheme involves a set of n players, with the authorised subsets being all sets of t or
more players and the unauthorised subsets being all sets of t−1 or fewer players. Such schemes
were proposed independently by Blakley and Shamir in 1979 [2, 18]. More generally, given a set
U of players we can define an access structure Γ to be the collection of all authorised subsets of
U , with all other subsets of U being unauthorised. We require Γ to be monotone, in the sense
that for A,B ⊆ U with A ⊆ B then if A ∈ Γ we have B ∈ Γ also. A multisecret sharing scheme
is a generalisation of secret sharing in which several secrets are shared according to different
access structures on the same set of participants [3, 4, 7, 9, 14]. In this paper we consider a
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specific class of multisecret sharing schemes that are suited to an application in RFID security
proposed by Juels, Pappu and Parno in USENIX 2008 [10]. We motivate the definition of these
schemes initially through the following toy example:
Scenario 1 (Distributed signing key for a committee with changing membership). A learned
society is lead by a committee with seven members. The members each serve a seven year term
on the committee; each year one member leaves the committee and a new member is elected
to replace them. Every year the society holds a conference in a different city and committee
meetings occur at these conferences. A meeting is deemed quorate as long as at least three
committee members are present.
The society wishes to distribute a signing key among the committee members that allows
them to sign the reports of their meetings at which at least three members are present. The
key will need to change each year to reflect the changed membership of the committee. However
they wish to avoid the need to change the members’ shares, since the shares are handed out at
the committee meetings, but not every member attends each meeting. Furthermore, the shares
belonging to any members who have left the committee should not reveal any information about
the current value of the committee’s signing key.
The requirements of Scenario 1 lead us to the following definition:
Definition 1.1 (Localised threshold multisecret sharing scheme). Let U = u0, u1, u2, . . . be an
ordered set of players. A window of length n consists of a set of n consecutive players, and we
denote by Wi the window {ui, ui+1, . . . , ui+n−1}. To each window Wi we assign a secret ki from
some finite secret space K. Let S be a finite set of shares. A scheme that associates a share
si ∈ S to each player ui is a localised multisecret sharing scheme with window length n and
threshold t (denoted (t;n)-LMSS) if it satisfies the following properties:
• for any i = 0, 1, 2, . . . the set of shares associated with the players in a set U ⊆ U allow
the secret ki to be recovered uniquely whenever |U ∩Wi| ≥ t;
• for any i = 0, 1, 2, . . . if U ⊆ U is a set of players with the property that |U ∩Wi| < t then
the shares associated with the players in U reveal no information about ki.
Example 1.1. The use of a (3; 7)-LMSS to distribute their signing keys would allow the com-
mittee in Scenario 1 to satisfy their requirements: the first seven committee members are the
players u0, u1, . . . , u6, and the remaining committee members are ordered by the year in which
they join the committee. Each player ui is given a share si. As illustrated in Figure 1, window
k2
s0 s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 . . .
u0 u1 u2 u3 u4 u5 u6 u7 u8 u9 u10 · · ·
W2
Figure 1: Depiction of window W2 in a (3; 7)-LMSS.
W2 contains players u2, u3, u4, u5, u6, u7 and u8, which correspond to the members who are
in the committee during year 2. Any three or more of these members can combine their shares
to recover the signing key k2 for year 2. For example, the set of members {u3, u6, u8} is an
authorised set for year 2, so shares s3, s6 and s8 can be used to reconstruct k2. On the other
hand, the set {u7, u8, u9, u10} only contains two members from within window W2 and hence
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the set of shares {s7, s8, s9, s10} do not reveal any information about k2. (They would, however,
allow k3, k4, k5, k6, k7 or k8 to be recovered.)
The key feature of an LMSS is the fact that the set of players is ordered and every minimal
authorised set of players is contained within a window of n consecutive players for some n. The
aim of this paper is to analyse the security of such schemes and provide efficient techniques for
their construction. In Section 2 of this paper we provide some necessary background details
on secret sharing and multisecret sharing. In Section 3 we provide theoretical results on the
security properties of LMSS including bounds on the share sizes, and give constructions of
schemes that meet these bounds. In Section 4 we explore how the definition of a LMSS can
be relaxed in order to permit schemes with smaller share sizes, and in Section 5 we show how
these ideas can be applied in a natural way in designing a scheme suitable for an application
in RFID-based supply chain management motivated by a proposal of Juels, Pappu and Parno
[10].
2 Background
Here we summarise some results and techniques from the literature that we use later in this
paper.
2.1 Secret Sharing
The earliest proposed examples of secret sharing schemes were for (t;n)-threshold schemes. The
following construction is due to Shamir and yields a (t;n)-threshold scheme for any positive
integers t, n with t ≤ n:
Construction 1 (Shamir’s Secret Sharing Scheme [18]). Let U be a set of n players, and let
p > n be a prime. For a given secret k ∈ Zp, select t− 1 further values r1, r2, rt−1 uniformly at
random from Zp, and let f ∈ Zp[x] be the polynomial defined by
f(x) = rt−1xt−1 + rt−2xt−2 + · · ·+ r1x+ k.
We identify each player with a unique nonzero element of Zp, and to player i we assign the
share f(i).
Any set of t or more players can perform polynomial interpolation on their shares in order
to recover the polynomial f and hence determine the secret k. However, for any set of t− 1 or
fewer players, and for any element k′ ∈ Zp, there exists a polynomial of degree at most t − 1
consistent with their shares and having constant term k′. Thus the shares of an unauthorised
set of players yield no information about the true value of k. Note that it is possible to replace
Zp by the finite field GF(q) for any prime power q > n, and that a slight adjustment can make
the scheme work for q ≥ n.
The properties of secret sharing schemes are often described using information theoretic
notation. Let K denote the discrete random variable corresponding to the choice of secret, and
let A denote the discrete random variable corresponding to the set of shares given to the players
in the set A ⊆ U . For a secret sharing scheme with access structure Γ we require H(K | A) = 0
for any authorised set A ∈ Γ, and H(K | B) = H(K) for any unauthorised set B /∈ Γ. A secret
sharing scheme satisfying the second of these properties is said to be perfect; Shamir’s secret
sharing scheme is an example of a perfect scheme. It is well known that for any perfect secret
sharing scheme, then H(Si) ≥ H(K), where Si is the discrete random variable corresponding to
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the share belonging to player ui. Informally speaking, the size of each share is at least the size
of the secret for any perfect scheme.
One way to allow the construction of schemes with smaller shares is to relax the requirement
for the scheme to be perfect. For example, a (t1, t2;n)-ramp scheme is a secret sharing scheme
in which any t2 players can use their shares to uniquely recover the secret, whereas the set
of shares belonging to any set of t1 or fewer players reveals no information about the secret.
Sets of players of sizes greater than t1 but smaller than t2 may learn partial information about
the secret, hence ramp schemes are not perfect. The average entropy of a player’s share in a
(t1, t2;n)-ramp scheme is known to be at least
log2 |K|
t2−t1 [12]. The following construction is based
on Construction 1, and achieves H(Si) =
H(K)
t2−t1 for each player ui; it is due to McEliece and
Sarwate [15].
Construction 2 ((t1, t2;n)-ramp scheme [15]). Set s = t2−t1. Let U be a set of n−s+1 players,
and let p > n be a prime. The secret for this scheme is an element k = (k1, k2, . . . , ks) ∈ Zsp.
It is shared by selecting a polynomial f uniformly from the set of all polynomials in Zp[s] that
satisfy f(0) = k1, f(1) = k2, . . . , f(s− 1) = ks. We identify each player with a unique nonzero
element of Zp \ {0, 1, . . . , s− 1}, and to player i we assign the share f(i).
As before, any set of t2 players can perform interpolation to recover f , which enables them
to recover the entire secret. In addition, it can be shown that any set of t1 or fewer players
learns no information about the secret.
2.2 Multisecret Sharing
Many authors have studied a generalisation of secret sharing in which several secrets are shared
according to different access structures on the same set of participants [3, 4, 7, 9, 14]. There are
various equivalent ways of defining security in such a setting; the following is due to Herranz,
Ruiz and Sa´ez [7]:
Definition 2.1. Let U be a set of players, and for j = 1, 2, . . . ,m let Γj be a monotone access
structure on U . Let Q be the set of possible secrets, and suppose that secrets k1, k2, . . . , km
are chosen from Q. A scheme that allocates to each player ui in U a share si from some set
S of potential shares is a weakly information-theoretic secure multi-secret sharing scheme if it
satisfies the following properties:
• (correctness) for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m and for any set A ⊂ U of players we have that if A ∈ Γj
then the shares of the players in A can be used to uniquely recover secret kj . In terms of
entropy, H(Kj | A) = 0 whenever A ∈ Γj .
• (weak information-theoretic security) if A /∈ Γj then the shares of the players in A reveal
no information about kj . That is, H(Kj | A) = H(Kj).
If, in addition, any set A /∈ Γj together with a set T of secrets with kj /∈ T reveals no information
about kj that is not already revealed by T alone (i.e. if H(Kj | A,T) = H(Kj | T)) then the
scheme is said to have strong information-theoretic security.
A (k;n)-LMSS is a special case of a multi-secret sharing scheme; the version presented in
Definition 1.1 corresponds to the case of a weakly information theoretically secure scheme. Our
analysis of these schemes in Section 3 will require the following theorem of Herranz, Ruiz and
Sa´ez:
Theorem 2.1 ([7]). Let Γ1, . . . ,Γ` be ` access structures on U and consider the player ui ∈ U .
Assume there exist subsets of players B1 ⊂ B2 ⊂ . . . ⊂ B` ⊂ U \ {ui} satisfying, for all
j = 1, 2, . . . , `, the following three conditions:
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1. Bj ∈ Γj−1 whenever j > 1;
2. Bj /∈ Γj;
3. Bj ∪ {ui} ∈ Γj .
Then, for any weakly-information theoretic secure multi-secret sharing scheme for Γ1,Γ2, . . . ,Γ`,
it holds that H(Si) ≥
∑`
i=1 H(Ki).
3 Bounds and constructions for LMSSs
A (t;n)-LMSS can be regarded as a weakly information-theoretic secure multisecret sharing
scheme with access structures Γ0,Γ1,Γ2, . . . , where Γi is a (t;n)-threshold access structure for
the set of players within window Wi. We note that it is possible to construct such a scheme by
deploying a (t;n)-threshold scheme in each window, as observed in [10] (the same approach has
been mentioned previously in the literature as a way to construct multisecret sharing schemes
for various other combinations of threshold access structures, e.g. [3]).
Construction 3 (Trivial (t;n)-LMSS [10]). Let U = u0, u1, u2, . . . be an ordered set of players,
and denote by Wi the window {ui, ui+1, . . . , ui+n−1}. Let p be a prime with p > n. For each
window Wi we share a secret ki ∈ Zp among the n players in Wi using a (t;n)-threshold scheme
(Construction 1). This is done independently for each window; a player uj is thus assigned
shares corresponding to each window that contains it, i.e. windows Wj−n+1,Wj−n+2, . . . ,Wj.
(The secrets may or may not be independent, but the randomness used in each of the threshold
schemes is chosen independently.))
It is straightforward to see that Construction 3 gives rise to a (t;n)-LMSS in which the total
share size for each player is n log p. In the case where k < n this turns out to be optimal, as
shown by the following theorem:
Theorem 3.1. Let U = u0, u1, u2, . . . be an ordered set of players. Suppose t < n and let Σ
be a weakly secure (t;n)-LMSS that associates a share si ∈ Q to each player ui. Then for any
j ≥ n− 1 we have that
H(Si) ≥
j∑
i=j−n+1
H(Ki).
Proof. For ease of notation we prove the result for j = n−1, but the proof applies analogously to
any j ≥ n− 1. Consider the sequence of players P = [u0, u1, . . . , u2n−2]. Restricting Σ to these
players yields a weak information-theoretic secure multi-secret sharing scheme on P where for
i = 0, . . . n− 1 the secret ki is shared according to the access structure Γi = {S ⊂Wi | |S| ≥ t}.
For r = 1, 2, . . . , n, let Br consist of the first t − 2 + r elements of P \ {un−1}. Then the
sets Bi satisfy the conditions for Theorem 2.1, and so we have that H(Sn−1) ≥
∑n−1
i=0 H(Ki)
as required.
If the secrets and shares are all uniformly distributed, we obtain the result that the size of
the secret given to player Pj with j ≥ n − 1 in a (t;n)-LMSS with t < n is at least n log |K|,
which implies that Construction 3 is optimal. (We address the case t = n in Section 3.1.) The
fact that there do not exist constructions for a (t;n)-LMSS with share sizes shorter than those
of Construction 3 means that these schemes are not suitable for applications that require small
shares. In Section 4 we consider various approaches to relaxing the security definitions for these
schemes in a controlled manner so as to allow more efficient constructions. On the positive
side, we observe that if the secrets are generated independently of each other, then the optimal
schemes of Construction 3 are in fact strongly information-theoretic secure.
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3.1 The case t = n
Interestingly, the restrictions of Theorem 3.1 do not apply in the case where t = n, as the
following construction demonstrates.
Construction 4. Let U = u0, u1, u2, . . . be an ordered set of players, and denote by Wi the
window {ui, ui+1, . . . , ui+n−1}. Suppose that for i ≥ 0 a secret ki is generated uniformly at
random from the set Zλ2 , and that this is done independently for each i. For i = 0, 1, . . . , n− 2
we assign a share si to player ui by generating si uniformly at random from Zλ2 . For i ≥ n− 1
we set si = ki−n+1 ⊕ si−n+1 ⊕ si−n+2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ si−1.
Theorem 3.2. Construction 4 results in an (n;n)-LMSS that has weak information-theoretic
security and optimal share size, but which does not possess strong information-theoretic security.
Proof. In an (n;n)-LMSS, the access structure Γj has a single minimal authorised subset A,
which is the set consisting of all n players in the window Wj :
A = {uj , uj+1, ..., uj+n−1}.
Note that the secret kj can be recovered from the shares belonging to players in A by calculating
kj = sj ⊕ sj+1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ si+n−2 ⊕ sj+n−1.
For the access structure Γj , the maximal unauthorised subsets have the form
Biˆ = {u0, u1, . . . , ui−1, ui+1, . . . , uj+n−1, . . . },
for some i with j ≤ i ≤ j + n− 1.
Suppose an attacker who wishes to determine kj possesses all the shares in Biˆ.
By definition of Construction 4,
sj+n−1 = kj ⊕ sj ⊕ sj+1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ si−1 ⊕ si ⊕ si+1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ sj+n−2,
hence
kj = sj ⊕ sj+1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ si−1 ⊕ si ⊕ si+1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ sj+n−2 ⊕ sj+n−1. (1)
The adversary knows all terms on the right hand side of (1) apart from the share si, which
we can express as
si = ki−n+1 ⊕ si−n+1 ⊕ si−n+2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ si−1. (2)
Strong security We show the construction does not have strong information-theoretic secu-
rity. In the strong security setting, in addition to the shares possessed by the players
in Biˆ, we assume the adversary also knows all secrets other than kj . In the case where
i 6= j+n− 1, this includes the secret ki−n+1, and so the adversary is able to determine si
using (2), and hence recover kj using (1).
When i = j + n − 1 (that is, when the missing share is the last one in the window) the
adversary does not possess ki−n+1. However, we observe that:
sj+n = kj+1 ⊕ sj+1 ⊕ sj+1 ⊕ ...⊕ sj+n−2 ⊕ sj+n−1.
The adversary possesses all terms in this expression other than sj+n−1 = si, hence they
can use it to recover si and thence kj as before.
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Weak security In the weak information theoretic setting, the adversary does not know any
secrets others than those it is able to compute using the shares in its possession. Consider
the following system of equations:
ki−n+1 = si−n+1 ⊕ si−n+2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ si−1 ⊕ si,
ki−n+2 = si−n+2 ⊕ si−n+3 ⊕ · · · ⊕ si ⊕ si+1,
...
ki = si ⊕ si+1 ⊕ ...⊕ si+n−2 ⊕ si+n−1.
This is a system of n linear equations. The adversary knows all the values except for the
n+1 values in the set S = {si, ki−n+1, ki−n+2, . . . , ki}. For every possible choice of kj ∈ Zλ2
there is a choice of the values in S \{kj} consistent with the set of shares corresponding to
players in B. Hence these shares reveal no new information about the secret kj , meaning
this construction has weak information theoretic security.
Optimality To see that this scheme is optimal with respect to share size, we note that restrict-
ing this construction to any window gives an (n;n)-threshold scheme for that window in
which the size of each share is the same as the size of the corresponding secret. Since for
a perfect (n;n)-threshold scheme the size of the shares must be at least as large as the
size of the secrets, this is optimal.
The scheme of Construction 4 thus gives an example of a (k;n)-LMSS that is weakly secure,
but not strongly secure. We note that it has independently generated secrets, thus demonstrat-
ing that having independently generated secrets is a necessary but not sufficient condition to
guarantee that a weakly secure scheme will also be strongly secure.
3.2 Time dependent schemes
In many applications such as that of Scenario 1, the secrets k0, k1, . . . of a LMSS have a natural
interpretation as a sequence of secrets that change over time. In such a setting it makes sense
to consider a security model that is intermediate between the strong and weak models:
Definition 3.1. A (weakly information theoretically secure) (k;n)-LMSS is said to have perfect
backward secrecy if the shares possessed by any set A /∈ Γj together with the set of the first
j secrets Tj = {k0, k1, . . . , kj−1} reveals no information about the secret kj other than that
already revealed by Tj . In entropy terms, H(Kj | A,Tj) = H(Kj | Tj).
Perfect backward secrecy ensures that the exposure of past secrets does not affect the security
of future secrets. Note that, by definition, a (t;n)-LMSS with perfect backward secrecy is
also a weakly information-theoretic (t;n)-LMSS. Furthermore, a strongly information-theoretic
(t;n)-LMSS necessarily has perfect backward secrecy. Thus perfect backward secrecy can be
seen as an intermediate requirement between weak and strong information-theoretic security.
A strongly information-theoretic scheme in fact possesses both perfect backward secrecy and
perfect forward secrecy, where compromise of future secrets does not affect the security of past
secrets. This is interesting from the point of view of motivating the strong security model, given
that Scenario 1 seemed a priori only to require weak security.
It is interesting to consider whether the scheme of Construction 4 has this property. The
following result shows that in fact it only has quite limited backward secrecy:
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Theorem 3.3. Construction 4 does not have perfect backward secrecy: an adversary possessing
the secrets k0, k1 . . . kj−1 and who also has shares of a maximal set of players Biˆ /∈ Γj can
determine kj except in the case where i = j + n− 1, where no information about kj is revealed.
Proof. Consider the proof of Theorem 3.2. In showing that an adversary who has access to all
secrets other than kj can recover kj in the case where i 6= j + n− 1 we in fact only made use of
secrets k` with ` < j. Hence the same argument demonstrates that this construction does not
give a backward secure scheme. Interestingly, when i = j + n − 1 the adversary in fact learns
nothing about kj in the backward secure setting. To see this, we consider the following set of
equations:
ki−n+1 = si−n+1 ⊕ si−n+2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ si−1 ⊕ si,
ki−n+2 = si−n+2 ⊕ si−n+3 ⊕ · · · ⊕ si ⊕ si+1,
...
ki = si ⊕ si+1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ si+n−2 ⊕ si+n−1.
This is a set of n linear equations with n + 1 unknowns, namely {ki−n+1, ki−n+2, . . . , ki, si}.
For every possible secret ki−n+1 there exist a choice for the remaining elements of this set that
is consistent with the view of the adversary. Therefore, the construction does ensure that an
adversary lacking share si−n+1 learns no information about ki−n+1.
4 Relaxing security requirements in order to construct more
efficient schemes
The bounds on share sizes implied by Theorem 3.1 mean that in order to construct a more
efficient (k;n)-LMSS it is necessary to relax the security definition. There are various ways
in which this could be done. The SWISS schemes proposed by Juels et al. are one example
[10]; we discuss some limitations of these schemes in Section 5. In this Section we consider
systematically a range of techniques that can be applied while still working in the setting of
information-theoretic security. Recall that the essential aims of a (k;n)-LMSS are to ensure
that any k suitably close users are able to recover a secret, and that each secret should only be
accessible to players within a bounded window. The techniques we consider here allow us to
maintain these goals, while relaxing the strict requirements of Definition 1.1 in ways that give
us a well understood trade-off between the security compromises and the resulting efficiency
gains.
4.1 Shifting to a nonperfect model of secret sharing
Section 2.1 indicated that the shares of a perfect (t;n)-threshold scheme have to be at least as
large as the secret, but that share sizes could be reduced by the use of a (t1, t2;n)-ramp scheme,
with the increased efficiency being traded against the relaxation of the security in that sets of
players of sizes between t1 and t2 can now gain partial information about the secret. The exact
same technique can be applied in the context of a (t;n)-LMSS, by replacing the use of Shamir’s
secret sharing scheme in Construction 3 with the (t1, t2;n)-ramp scheme of Construction 2.
Reducing the sizes of sets of players that are excluded from learning any information about the
secret from t2 − 1 to t1 in this manner allows us to decrease the size of the shares by a factor
of t2 − t1.
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4.2 Changing the access structures
One consequence of Definition 1.1 is that the functionality (in terms of which keys a given player
can contribute to recovering) is inextricably tied directly to the security (in terms of the sizes
of the windows of players that can contribute to recovering a particular key.) Specifically, if we
wish to consider windows of length n, then according to this definition each player is necessarily
a participant in n distinct windows. As this connects directly to the storage overheads for each
player, this restriction limits the scope for improving the efficiency of such schemes. It would be
desirable to have greater flexibility in varying the parameters of a scheme. One way to achieve
this is to decouple the access structure (i.e., the definition of which sets of players are authorised
to access keys) from the pattern of key distribution (i.e., which keys are able to be accessed by
particular authorised sets.) In this section we will set up a framework for analysing this more
general setting, and explore the resulting consequences in terms of security and practicality. In
Section 5 we will see how these more general schemes can be deployed effectively in a practical
setting.
The access structure in isolation: As previously, we consider an ordered set of players de-
noted by U = u0, u1, u2, . . . . We define an access structure Γ on U by specifying that
the authorised sets in Γ are all those subsets of U that contain a subset of the form
S = {ui1 , ui2 , . . . , uit} where i1 < i2 < · · · < it and it − i1 ≤ n − 1. That is, any subset
of U that contains t or more players from within a window of n consecutive players is
authorised. We think of the authorised sets in Γ as being those that have the right to
reconstruct at least one key.
Key windows: The defining property of a localised secret sharing scheme is that we want
any given key to be accessible by sufficiently large sets of players that are suitably close.
For a given key k we suppose there is a specific key window W k consisting of the players
ui, ui+1, . . . ui+`−1 that we think of as having the potential to be involved in recovering k.
Note that unlike in Section 3, we no longer require ` = n but we can also allow ` ≥ n.
The effect of Γ within a key window: We now consider the restriction of the access struc-
ture Γ to the window W k. This gives us an access structure Γk on the players in W k
whose authorised sets are all those of the form A ∈ Γ with A ⊆W k. This is illustrated in
Figure 2 for the case ` = 4 and n = k = 2.
k
si si+1 si+2 si+3
ui ui+1 ui+2 ui+3
W k
Figure 2: For ` = 4 and n = k = 2, any pair of adjacent players are authorised to recover the
secret.
For ` > n the access structure Γk is no longer a threshold access structure. It is possible to
construct a secret sharing scheme assigning shares to the players in W k that enable authorised
sets in Γk to recover k while preventing the shares belonging to any set S /∈ Γk from gaining any
information about k [8]. However, in general this may require the share sizes to be larger than
the size of k. For example, in the case where ` = 4 and n = t = 2 (as depicted in Figure 2),
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Capocelli et al. show that it is necessary for the largest share to be at least 50% larger than the
size of the secret [5].
One approach to avoiding this issue (as suggested in [10]) is simply to use a (t; `)-threshold
scheme to share k among the players in W k, since this allows shares that are no larger than
the size of the secret (and permits a straightforward trade-off between security and share size
through the use of a suitable ramp scheme if desired). However, in the case where ` is signifi-
cantly larger than n (the schemes proposed in [10] have ` ≥ 2n) this results in many subsets of
W k that are not authorised having shares that allow them to recover the secret, namely any set
of t shares {si1 , si−2, . . . , sit} with i1 < i2 < · · · < it and it − i1 > n. This can be substantially
mitigated at no extra cost by the use of the following construction:
Construction 5. We generate shares in the secret k for the players in W k as follows:
• We share k using a (t;n)-threshold scheme and assign the resulting shares s1, s2, . . . , sn
to the first n players in the window.
• We then assign s1, s2, . . . , sn in turn to the next n players in turn and so on, cycling
through the shares as necessary throughout the rest of the window.
This construction ensures that the shares possessed by any n consecutive players are precisely
those of a (t;n)-threshold scheme, and so the shares of any subset of t or more of those n
consecutive players can recover the secret, as required by Γk. There is potential for a small
saving in the size of the shares relative to using a (t; `)-threshold scheme since it is possible
to use a field of size n rather than `. However the main advantage of this construction is in
reducing the number of sets S /∈ Γk that can recover k. For a (t; `)-threshold scheme, there are(
`
t
)
subsets of size t that can recover the secret, whereas Γk contains only (` − n)(n−1t−1) + (nt)
authorised subsets of size t (there are
(
n
t
)
ways of choosing such a subset from among the last
n players in the window; for subsets not wholly contained within the last n players there are
` − n possible choices for the first player in the subset and (n−1t−1) ways to choose the rest of
the subset from the n − 1 subsequent players.). For example, if ` = 4 and n = t = 2 then the
threshold scheme has
(
4
2
)
= 6 pairs of shares that can recover the secret, whereas Γk only has
2
(
1
1
)
+
(
2
2
)
= 3 authorised pairs. This implies that half of the pairs of players enabled by the
threshold scheme to access the secret are not in Γk. For the scheme given in Construction 5, on
the other hand, in the case where ` = λn there are λt
(
n
t
)
subsets of size t that can recover the
secret. For ` = 4 and n = t = 2 this gives 22
(
2
2
)
= 4 pairs that can recover the secret, so only a
quarter of these are not in Γk.
We note that Construction 5 can also be instantiated with a ramp scheme in place of the
threshold scheme if desired.
4.3 Staggering key windows
If we were to fix ` = n and require a new key window of length n starting with player ui for every
i = 1, 2, . . . then we would recover Definition 1.1. However, by allowing distinct values of ` and
n, and allowing more flexibility in the distribution of the key windows we can obtain a family of
schemes that have the potential for much greater flexibility in tailoring their properties to suit
our application requirements. One way to do this is to introduce a parameter d that describes
the offset between consecutive key windows, so that key k0 is associated with the window W
k0 =
{u0, u1, u2, . . . , u`−1}, key k1 is associated with the window W k1 = {ud, ud+1, . . . , ud+`−1}, and
so on. In general, key ki is associated with the window W
ki = {uid, uid+1, . . . , uid+`−1}.
The following lemmas describe basic properties of the scheme that arises from staggering
the key windows in this fashion.
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Lemma 4.1. An authorised set A = {ui1 , ui2 , . . . , uit} with it − i1 = c for some c ≤ n− 1 can
reconstruct b `−cd c or d `−cd e secrets.
Proof. The shares corresponding to the players in set A allow them to recover the secret for any
window W with A ⊆ W . A window of length ` contains A if it starts with a player between
uit−` and ui1 . This is a range of ui−1 − uit−` = `− (uit − ui1) = `− c possible starting points.
If the windows have offset d then for any value of it at least b `−cd c windows, and up to d `−cd e
windows will start in this range.
The share storage requirements for any individual player are given by the following lemma:
Lemma 4.2. Any single player is associated with either b `dc or d `de shares.
The proof is a direct analogue of that of Lemma 4.1.
Example 4.1. Suppose we take ` = 2n and d = n. Then every player is associated with shares
from two distinct key windows, and any authorised set is able to recover either one or two
distinct window keys.
4.4 Combining techniques
Combining all the techniques discussed in this section gives us the following construction:
Construction 6 (Flexible Localised Multisecret Sharing Scheme (t1, t2;n, `, d)-fLMSS). Let
U = u0, u1, u2, . . . be an ordered set of players, and denote by Wi the window {ui, ui+1, . . . , ui+`−1}.
Let p be a prime with p > n. For each window Wi for i = 0, d, 2d, 3d, . . . we share a secret
σi ∈ Zp among the ` players in Wi using Construction 5 implemented with a (t, k, n)-ramp
scheme.
The following properties of this construction follow directly from the earlier results in this
section.
Theorem 4.3. A (t1, t2;n, `, d)-fLMSS has the following properties:
• (storage) If the secrets are all independent and identically distributed according to the
uniform random variable K then the size of the shares of each tag are d `de log2 |K|t2−t1 bits.
• (key recovery) Any set of players {ui1 , ui2 . . . , uim} ⊆ Wi for i = 0, d, 2d, . . . with m ≥ t2
and im − i1 ≤ n is able to recover the secret ki.
Example 4.2. Consider key windows of length ` = 150, with an offset of d = 40 between con-
secutive window keys. Let n = 100, t2 = 50 and t1 = 30, so any 50 players ui1 , ui2 , . . . , ui50 with
i50−i1 ≤ 99 are able to fully construct a common secret, whereas sets of 30 or fewer players learn
no information about the secret. Using Lemma 4.1, an authorised set A = {ui1 , ui2 , . . . , ii50}
with i50− i1 = c for some c ≤ 99 is able to reconstruct b150−c40 c or d150−c40 e secrets. For example,
when c = 50 we have
`− c
d
=
150− 50
40
= 2.5,
so each authorised subset is always able to construct at least two, and potentially up to three,
window secrets. To illustrate this, consider the authorised set A = {u120, u121, . . . , u169},
which is depicted in Figure 3. The shares in A are capable of reconstructing the secrets
W40,W80 and W120. This is the maximum possible. Consider a different authorised set
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W0
W40
W80
W120
W160
W200
W240
` = 150
d = 40
A
u210 u235
u0 u40 u80 u120 u160 u200 u240 u280 u320 u360 u400
Figure 3: Illustration of properties of the (30, 50; 100, 150, 40)-fLMSS of Example 4.2.
Y = {u119, u120, . . . , u168}. The players in Y can reconstruct the secrets W40 and W80, but
no longer has sufficient shares to compute W120.
Lemma 4.2 implies that any single player is associated with either b15040 c or d15040 e shares. In
this example,
`
d
=
150
40
= 3.75,
so each individual player is associated with either 3 or 4 shares. For example, consider the
player u210. This player must hold shares for the windows W80,W120,W160 and W200 and hence
is an example of a player who holds four shares. On the other hand, player u235 must hold
a secret for W120.W160 and W200 and thus holds three shares. Both players are illustrated in
Figure 3.
Theorem 4.3 states that the total size of the shares of each player in a (t1, t2;n, `, d)-fLMSS
is ⌈
`
d
⌉
log2 |K|
k − t
bits. Here, we have a (30, 50; 100, 150, 40)-fLMSS, so if we are wishing to have a uniformly
generated 32 bit secret (for example), we obtain⌈
`
d
⌉
log2(p)
k − t =
⌈
150
40
⌉
32
50− 30 = 4×
32
20
< 7,
so we would require each player to store at most 7 bits. For a secret of 64 bits, we would require
at most 13 bits of storage. In comparison, were we to use Construction 3 each player would be
required to store 100 shares each of size 32 bits, leading to a total storage of 3200 bits, or 6400
bits in the case of 64 bit secrets.
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5 Application to key distribution for RFID-enabled supply chains
In this section we consider the application of fLMSS to the distribution of keys for RFID tags
used in supply-chain management. Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is a technology that
uses radio signals to identify objects [1]. An RFID system consists of a tag, a reader and a back-
end server [1]. The devices are used in transportation, logistics, manufacturing and processing.
Typical applications include inventory control, animal tagging, postal tracking, airline baggage
management, access control, and manufacturing processes [17].
RFID tags enable the identification, tracking and verification of products in a supply chain
both automatically and in real time [1], hence their use is becoming more prevalent in manufac-
turing. They have the potential to store information such as batch numbers, date of manufac-
ture, and so on. In supply chains, the predominant RFID standard is known as the Electronic
Product Code (EPC) [6]. EPC tags can be regarded as new generation bar-codes that emit a
code containing four elements [10]: a header, which denotes the EPC version number; a domain
manager that details the manufacturer; an object class that specifies the item type; and a serial
number, which is a universal identifier for the item. The unique serial number enables the tag
to be linked to a database containing other vital information related to the product. Storing
the EPC rather than all the information relevant to the product requires less memory on the
tag, which is ideal as tags have a limited memory of up to 2KB of data [10].
However, the use of these tags creates new security and privacy challenges: for instance, a
consumer who is in possession of a tagged product runs the risk that a passerby could scan the
tag and thereby determine that they are carrying the product. There are many items such as
medications for which this is potentially undesirable. One further complication is that there
may not exist any prior secure channels (in the form of shared secret keys or similar) between
the manufacturer and agents, such as merchants, who legitimately require access to the tags’
contents. One way to address this is to exploit differences in the way in which a legitimate user
is able to access the data on a tag or tags, as opposed to the potentially more restricted access
available to a casual adversary. Juels, Pappu and Parno consider the following scenario:
Scenario 2 (Distributing a key over the RFID tags on all the items in a case [10]). Suppose a
manufacturer places tags on items that are shipped in bulk to a merchant who then sells them
individually to customers. The merchant (who has a legitimate need to read the tag identities)
has access to many tags. On the other hand, after the items are sold, an adversary (who should
be prevented from recovering the tag identities) is expected to only have access to a small number
of tags.
In this scenario, the items are assumed to be shipped by the case-load to the merchant, and
Juels et al. suggest the use of a secret sharing scheme to distribute a key across all the tags
in a case of items, with each tag receiving a single share. This ensures that the merchant who
possesses the entire case can gather enough shares to recover the identity, but once the items
have been sold they are sufficiently dispersed that the identity can no longer be recovered. This
is an example of a situation where a threshold (or ramp) secret sharing scheme gives a natural
solution to the problem of securing identities of RFID tags from adversaries with access to a
small number of tags, while allowing merchants who possess entire cases of tags to access the
relevant information.
Juels et al. propose keeping the share sizes small by using a variation of a scheme due to
Krawczyk that provides computational (rather than information-theoretic) security [11]. In
Krawczyk’s original scheme a large secret is encrypted with a (relatively) short key and the
resulting ciphertext is shared using a (0, k;n)-ramp scheme, while the key is shared using a
(k;n)-threshold scheme. Juels et al. suggest sharing both the key and the ciphertext with a
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secret sharing scheme based on an error-correcting code, and claim that this enables them to
‘make the size of our shares independent of the secret’. In fact this is not correct, nor is their
assertion that Krawczyk’s scheme has ‘shares with lengths independent of the secret’s size’.
Rather, as Krawczyk states in his abstract [11], his scheme is ‘an m-threshold scheme... in
which shares corresponding to a secret S are of size |S|m plus a short piece of information whose
length does not depend on the secret size but just in the security parameter. (The bound of |S|m
is clearly optimal if the secret is to be recovered from m shares.)’.
The use of error correcting codes for secret sharing has been long studied [15, 13]; in partic-
ular it is known that a length n code with distance d and dual distance d∗ gives a (t1, t2;n− 1)-
ramp scheme with t1 = d
∗ − 2 and t2 = n − d + 1 (see, for example, [16] for details). Thus
if the dual distance of the code is small, then t1 is also small and the resulting scheme only
guarantees protection of the secret against small coalitions of players. In Krawczyk’s scheme
the computation security is ensured by the fact a threshold scheme is used to share the key.
Replacing the threshold scheme in this construction by one based on an error correcting code
leads to a similar reduction in security as would be caused by simply using a ramp scheme to
share the message directly, does not reduce the storage relative to this more straightforward
approach, and offers only computational rather than information-theoretic security guarantees.
As such, this error-correcting code approach does not appear to offer any clear advantages in
this context.
5.1 Instantiating a solution for Scenario 2
In order to use a secret-sharing based scheme for Scenario 2, it is necessary to preload the
appropriate data on all the tags. Once a case has been ordered, the supplier can set up the
appropriate tags and attach them to all the items in the case. However, this may be time
consuming and inconvenient. Instead, it would be more convenient to be able to attach the
tags to the products as they come off the production line prior to packing. This leads to the
following scenario, which is essentially that considered by Juels et al. in their Example 2 [10].
Scenario 3 (Setting up a sequence of RFID tags for items coming off a production line). Suppose
a manufacturer attaches RFID tags to items as they come off the production line. The items are
then packed and shipped to meet orders coming in from wholesale customers. The manufacturer
wishes to distribute keys across items in an order using a (t;n)-threshold secret sharing scheme,
as in Scenario 2. However, the customers may order differing numbers of items, and at the
time when the data is being placed on the tags the manufacturer does not yet know what these
orders are going to be (either in terms of their sizes or to which customer they will be shipped).
The shares on the tags in a single order must enable the wholesaler to recover a suitable key,
yet adversaries who obtain fewer than t shares from a given order should learn no information
about the key. (In particular, this means that the tags from a certain wholesaler’s orders should
not allow that wholesaler to learn the key corresponding to another wholesale customer’s order.)
Juels et al. propose the use of a Sliding-Window-Information-Secret-Sharing (SWISS) scheme
for this purpose. Their basic SWISS scheme uses a (k;n)-threshold scheme with key window
length ` = 2n and offset d = n. They observe that this can be generalised to ` = (Ψ+1)nΨ with
d = nΨ for Ψ < n. They further note that in place of a threshold scheme they could use the
secret sharing scheme they developed for Scenario 2.
The fact that the choice of Ψ completely determines ` and d once n is known is unnecessarily
restrictive here. We observe that the requirements of Scenario 3 are in fact essentially the
same as those of Scenario 1; hence, a (t1, t2;n, `, d)-fLMSS is an appropriate solution for the
manufacturer’s needs in this situation.
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Example 5.1. In Example 4.2, we saw that the use of a (30, 50; 100, 150, 40)-fLMSS allowed a
64 bit secret to be distributed while only requiring each player to store a 13 bit share. This is
well within the capacity of an EPC Gen2 RFID tag, and would be suitable, for example, in a
situation where merchants order shipments of at least 100 items at a time.
Advantages of using a fLMSS for this application include the following:
• The direct use of a ramp scheme rather than an arbitrary error-correcting code explicitly
gives the values of the important parameters, so that the resulting trade-off between
security and efficiency is entirely clear. Furthermore, the use of Construction 2 in the
fLMSS gives the essential property that both the sharing and the secret recovery can be
efficiently performed.
• The fLMSS provides information-theoretic security rather than relying on computational
assumptions.
• The use of Construction 5 reduces the number of unauthorised sets who can access a given
secret relative to a SWISS scheme of analogous parameters.
• By separating the window length ` from the offset d, we have enabled a more flexible
choice of parameters that allows for the appropriate security/efficiency trade-off to be
chosen to directly suit application requirements.
The systematic analysis of the various components of the fLMSS in Section 4 ensures that the
trade-offs inherent in the selection of parameters are explicit and well-understood, making the
fLMSS a widely applicable tool for applications of this nature.
6 Conclusion
Localised multisecret sharing is a natural concept with a range of potential applications. We
have showed that a fLMSS scheme provides a flexible and lightweight tool for approximating the
ideal behaviour of a (t;n)-LMSS in a restricted environment such as that provided by the use of
RFID tags. Interesting open problems would be to find further applications for these schemes,
and to determine whether their security can be further enhanced through improvements to
Construction 5.
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